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CREATIVE ASPECTS OF 
NATURAL LAW 
DURING the current half century, and a little 
longer, several writers of distinction have at -
tempted to develop and expound philosophies, or 
coherent general notions, concerning the process 
of organic evolution. The historical fact of organic 
evolution had been established by biologists, work-
ing in their characteristic comparative manner, 
by the ascertainment of very numerous individual 
observations, combined with a limited amount 
of reflexion upon them. They are on the whole 
distrustful of speculative generalisation, and easily 
confused by abstractions, in their short -lived con-
troversies. The writers to whom I shall particu-
larly refer are Bergson and Smuts. Each, in his 
own way, is a brilliant expositor; each, viewing 
the contemporary scene of biological thought, 
has been strongly moved by the idea that the bio-
logists were missing something, something of 
central significance to their science, and to all 
mankind. Each gives particular importance to 
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the word creative: 'creative evolution' in Bergson 
and Smuts, to whom organic evolution is a 
central theme; 'creative process' in Whitehead, 
whose centres of interest are physical and sub-
jective respectively. 
Now, here, and in 1950, is there anything for 
us in these writers? That is what I want to discuss 
in this lecture. Is there anything for us as men of 
Science, and again anything for us as what I may 
call, without narrow limitations, religious men: 
men who earnestly wish to live their lives to good 
purpose? I believe that there may be, but that it 
will need a good deal of disentangling.  
Perhaps I should begin by saying what I appre-
hend the word 'creative' to mean. First, taking 
the word coldly and dryly, divesting it of emo-
tional significance and moral associations, I take it 
to qualify effective causation; to imply that had 
the nature or intensity of the causal system been 
different, the effects which flow from it would 
also be different; merely different, not necessarily 
worse or better. This requires that the causal sys-
tem itself might really have been different, and so 
have entailed different real consequences. Creative 
causation in this sense is thinkable in an indeter-
ministic world, in which the causative system 
might indeed have been different. It is quite un-
thinkable in a strictly deterministic world, such as 
2 
until recently it was thought proper to assume 
in all the sciences. The possibility of regarding 
causation in the real world as indeterministic 
was open to thinkers before our own time; it was 
clearly expressed, for example, by Lucretius; but 
until recently it was dismissed as an unnecessarily 
complicated hypothesis. The two advances which 
have changed the scene are: (i) The positive 
evidence for determinism provided by scientific 
experimentation on a molar scale is seen to be 
inconclusive as soon as it is recognised that the 
predictability of the behaviour of large masses is a 
necessary statistical consequence of the large num-
ber of independent particles of which they are 
composed, and would be manifested whatever 
were the nature of the ultimate reality. (ii) The 
study of atoms, and sub-atomic particles and 
processes, can, it now appears, only be carried on 
by recognising indeterminism as inherent in their 
nature. It is particularly important, in this respect, 
that there is not a vague or uncertain degree of 
indeterminism, but a specific amount, calculable 
from one of the fundamental constants of physics. 
No appeal to subjectivity, or to human limita-
tions, can explain it away. It is, for the present 
generation, one of its most important tasks to 
recognise what this change in our outlook re-
quires, and to adjust our minds to its implications.  
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The first implication, therefore, that I put be-
fore you, is that in the world as we must now 
conceive it, natural causation has a creative aspect, 
at least in the very simple and prosaic sense in 
which I am now using the word creative. It has a 
creative aspect, because it has a casual aspect. 
These are the back and the front of the same 
quality. Looking back at the cause we can recog-
nise it as creative; it has brought about something 
which could not have been predicted—some-
thing which cannot be referred back to ante-
cedent events. Looking forward to it as a future 
event, there is in it something which we can re-
cognise as casual. It is viewed thus like the result of 
a game of chance; we can imagine ourselves able 
to foresee all its possible forms, and to state in 
advance the probability that each will occur. We 
can no longer imagine ourselves capable of fore-
seeing just which of them will occur. 
There is in the word creative, as I conceive it, 
another strand of meaning, to which my first 
approach deliberat ely does no justice. It is charged 
with emotion, and I have no wish to discharge it, 
only to make a necessary distinction. The word 
seems appropriate to us only when applied to 
matters of importance; especially to something 
new; not merely new in time like a new penny, 
but new in its nature and potentialities. This is 
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intended when we apply the word to the work 
of a scientist, or an artist ; that his work matters 
in itself, and to the future of his art or science. 
Work to be creative in this sense must have 
value, intellectual or aesthetic, moral or social 
value; consequences which excite wonder, or 
admiration. 
If I have correctly apprehended the two aspects 
of the word, there are two modes in which it may 
be correctly used. In the scientific mode, without 
emotional excitation, we recognise creative cau-
sation at work at all times and places. For any 
particular event, it is a purely scientific problem 
to ascertain the causative action, limited in time 
and space, which effectively brought it about; we 
shall have to avoid the error of imagining that 
the effective causation can be traced back to ante-
cedent events, or through them back to the be-
ginning of things. Just when and where an event 
was caused to occur is an intrinsic part of our 
understanding of our working of the world. 
When, however, we apply the word to cases ap-
propriate to its emotional repercussions, that is to 
the creation of things of great importance to our-
selves, the scientific task is of the same kind, but 
our interest and motivation arc animated by the 
importance of our enquiry, and by the latent con-
sequences of its possible success. The task is felt to 
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be worthy of the effort; we cannot scrutinise our 
inferences, or test them, too carefully. 
Approaching the matter on this level, it is, 
therefore, almost axiomatic that the process by 
which living things, as we know them, have come 
gradually into existence, is, in the fullest sense, a 
creative process. It has created new things, preg-
nant with potentiality; it has produced among 
other things growth, voluntary movement, and 
appetite; striving and effort, joy and pain; con-
sciousness, and, in Man at least, conscious self-
criticism. It would be strange if the word did not 
fit, seeing that for ages it has been used precisely for 
the coming into existence of these things, however 
variously the process was conceived. It is almost 
like saying that Creation is creative; the only new 
implication, and it is an important one, that the 
phrase now has is that for us creation is still going 
on, whereas in the childhood of our race it was 
thought to have been all finished a long while ago. 
Bergson's title L'Evolution creatrke was there-
fore well justified, and well in advance of his time. 
The biological thought of his age was impeded 
and constricted by the assumption of completely 
deterministic causation; the so-called 'Mutation 
theory', as a contribution to evolutionary thought, 
seems to me to be typical of the relative sterility 
of the epoch. Bergson, with striking originality, 
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broke away from this assumption. He was in-
deed an indeterminist, but he scarcely recognised 
in determinism the constraint from which he was 
breaking free. He confuses the issue by speaking 
instead of mechanism; but whereas the difference 
between deterministic and indeterministic cau-
sation is simple, and easy to define with rigour, 
no one has been able to suggest a way of distin-
guishing a mechanistic from a vitalistic organism. 
Moreover, later, he dismisses vitalism also, though 
here finer distinctions are necessary. Let me first 
quote him when he comes nearest to explicit in-
determinism, using Mitchell's translation of 1911 
(pp. 39-41). 
The mechanistic explanations, we said, hold good 
for systems that our thought artificially detached from 
the whole. But of the whole itself and of the systems 
which, within this whole, seem to take after it, we 
cannot admit a priori that they are mechanically 
explicable, for then time would be useless, and even 
unreal. The essence of mechanical explanation, in fact, 
is to regard the future and the past as calculable func-
tions of the present, and thus to claim that all is given. 
On this hypothesis, past, present and future would be 
open at a glance to a superhuman intellect capable of 
making the calculation. Indeed, the scientists who 
have believed in the universality and perfect objecti-
vity of mechanical explanations have, consciously or 
unconsciously, acted on a hypothesis of this kind. 
Laplace formulated it with the greatest precision: 'An 
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intellect which at a given instant knew all the forces 
with which nat ure is animated, and the respective 
situations of the beings that compose nature—sup-
posing the said intellect were vast enough to subject 
these data to analysis—would embrace in the same 
formula the motions of the greatest bodies in the 
universe and those of the slightest atom: nothing 
would be uncertain for it, and the future, like the 
past, would be present to its eyes.'1 And Du Bois-
Reymond: 'We can imagine the knowledge of nature 
arrived at a point where the universal process of the 
world might be represented by a single mathematical 
formula, by one immense system of simultaneous 
differential equations, from which could be deduced, 
for each moment, the position, direction, and velocity 
of every atom of the world,'2 Huxley has expressed 
the same idea in a more concrete form: 'If the funda-
mental proposition of evolution is true, that the 
entire world, living and not living, is the result of the 
mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the 
forces possessed by the molecules of which the primi-
tive nebulosity of the universe was composed, it is no 
less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in 
the cosmic vapour, and that a sufficient intellect could, 
from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules 
of that vapour, have predicted, say the state of the 
Fauna of Great Britain in 1869, with as much certainty 
as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the 
breath on a cold winter's day.' 
1 Laplace, 'Introduction à la theorie analytique des 
probabilités' Oeuvres Complètes, vol. VII. Paris, 1886, p. 
vi. 
2 Du Bois-Reymond, Uber die Grenzen des 
Naturerkennens, Leipzig, 1892. 
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To these opinions Bergson answers: 
In such a doctrine, time is still spoken of: one pro -
nounces the word, but one does not think of the 
thing. For time is here deprived of efficacy, and if it 
does nothing, it is nothing. Radical mechanism 
implies a metaphysic in which the totality of the real 
is postulated complete in eternity, and in which the 
apparent duration of things expresses merely the 
infirmity of a mind that cannot know everything at 
once. But duration is something very different from 
this for our consciousness, that is to say, for that which 
is most indisputable in our experience. We perceive 
duration as a stream against which we cannot go. It 
is the foundation of our being, and, as we feel, the 
very substance of the world in which we live. It is of 
no use to hold up before our eyes the dazzling 
prospect of a universal mathematic; we cannot sacri-
fice experience to the requirements of a system. That 
is why we reject radical mechanism. 
The truth seems to be that Bergson paid a great 
price for his freedom, and I suggest that no such 
sacrifice is required of us. We are born free. Be-
cause he felt that much biological thought was 
mistaken he is willing to infer radical defects in 
the reasoning powers of the human race, an idea 
that has been influential on later writers, and 
should therefore be answered. More, and worse, 
he is willing to sacrifice the whole scientific pro -
cedure of tracing effects to demonstrable causes, 
in favour of invoking as their explanation an  
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imaginary (I suppose spiritual) being, endowed 
with will and intelligence, whose modus operandi 
is as simply magical as that of any wish -granting 
fairy in a children's story. Thus, in criticising the 
Lamarckians he says (p. 92): 
But if this cause is nothing but the conscious e ffort 
of the individual, it cannot operate in more than a 
restricted number of cases—at most in the animal 
world, and not at all in the vegetable kingdom. Even 
in animals, it will act only on points which are under 
the direct or indirect control of the will. And even 
where it does act, it is not clear how it could compass 
a change so profound as an increase of complexity: 
at most this would be conceivable if the acquired 
characters were regularly transmitted so as to  be 
added together; but this transmission seems to be the 
exception rather than the rule. A hereditary change 
in a definite direction, which continues to accumulate 
and add to itself so as to build up a more and more 
complex machine, must certainly be related to some 
sort of effort, but to an effort of far greater depth 
than the individual effort, far more independent of 
circumstances, an effort common to most representa-
tives of the same species, inherent in the germs they 
bear rather than in their substan ce alone, an effort 
thereby assured of being passed on to their descen-
dants. 
So we come back, by a somewhat roundabout 
way, to the idea we started from, that of an original 
impetus of life, passing from one generation of germs 
to the following generation of germs through the 
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developed   organisms   which   bridge   the   interval 
between the generations.  
Now, I submit that the mythological being to 
whom Bergson has introduced us serves no useful 
purpose in the understanding of the evolutionary 
phenomena; that it merely supplies one more 
example of those hypothetical causes of mutations, 
which are now set aside, not merely on the 
ground that they do not exist, but on the ground, 
at a deeper level, that they would not explain or 
compass the evolut ionary process, if they did 
exist. Bergson's is the extreme term of a series of 
proposals, differing indeed in the repugnance that 
they arouse, yet all to be rejected on the same 
factual evidence. Nearest, in this spectrum, to 
Bergson's 'elan vital' I should place Lamarck's 
proposal that the desires of individual animals pos-
sess the power of so altering the germinal inheri-
tance that these desires in their descendants shall 
be mor e readily gratified. Like Bergson's this 
operation is strictly magical; it springs from the old 
belief that mere willing, if sufficiently prolonged 
or intense, has, through unseen channels, power 
to arrive at wish -fulfilment. It is, however, more 
rational than Bergson's, for the appetites of ani-
mals do really exist, they are not a sheer construct 
of human imagination, as is a being capable of 
willing and learning, working collectively through  
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a whole species, or through all living creation. 
We reject Lamarckism not because we doubt the 
reality of desire, but inter alia because we doubt its 
power to devise and bring into existence the sup -
posed changes in inheritance. Third in the series, 
should be placed Darwin's theory of the effects of 
habit,  through use and disuse of parts. Habit 
really has effects upon the body and mind of the 
progenitor, and, on the theory of inheritance ac -
cepted by Darwin, should induce changes in the 
same direction in its descendants. Darwin thus 
accepted the inheritance of acquired characters in 
theory, but made it abundantly clear that he 
thought the evolutionary effects of this factor to 
have been extremely slight, and gives many ex-
amples, such as the special organs and instincts of 
neuter insects, in which it cannot even have aided 
the process of progressive adaptation. Those who, 
like Weismann, rejected the inheritance of ac -
quired characters as a real phenomenon, as is done 
now universally on the genetic evidence, have, 
therefore, never thought of themselves as opposed 
to Darwin. 
The modus operandi of Smuts's concept of holism 
falls, if I understand it correctly, into a place in 
this scries between those of Lamarck and Darwin. 
For he too rested the creative causation of the 
evolutionary process on the occurrence of minor  
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mutations, occurring specifically in the germ cell, 
or fertilised ovum, as a result of its constant ten-
dency to completeness or integration. He did not, 
any more than Darwin, make calls on the magical 
efficacy of will power. 
To this aspect of his teaching Smuts gave a 
good deal of space, not, I think, because it plays 
any part in his system of intrinsic importance, but 
because, being biologically heterodox, it was felt 
to require a rather elaborate justification. Re-
reading Sm uts with this point in mind, one is all 
the more struck by the wisdom and width of his 
more essential views, and by the religious feeling, 
if I may use the term, with which he concen-
trates the majestic spectacle of the evolutionary 
process to a meaningful focus. 
Now, to those who accept a particulate theory 
of inheritance all these hypothetical agencies for 
causing mutation, or any others, fail by reason of 
the smallness of the mutation rates allowable. As 
soon as the blending theory of inheritance was 
replaced by one on a particulate basis all mutation 
rates were cut down at least ten-thousandfold. It 
is demonstrable, that either the mutation rates 
which can be measured experimentally, or in-
deed any, compatible with particulate inheritance, 
are incompetent to govern, control or even ap-
preciably to modify the course of evolutionary 
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change. An instructive example of what I mean 
is afforded by polydactyly, producing an extra 
hallux, with an extra joint, found as a result of 
mutation in a good many species of birds and 
mammals. It has probably been occurring in the 
ancestry of these species from the remote time of 
the separation of the mammalian and avian classes. 
Throughout this immense period innumerable 
and often drastic modifications of the structure 
of the feet have taken place in different lineages 
of these classes, yet never has this mutation of 
polydactyly, constantly offering itself, though 
constantly rejected, been allowed to incorporate 
itself in any evolving line. The only evolutionary 
effect which can reasonably be ascribed to its 
unrelenting efforts is the negative one, that 
in mice and probably other quick-breeding 
forms, the germ plasm has been modified so 
as to suppress all traces of polydactyly in the 
heterozygote. 
If we imagine, then, some extra-natural agency 
endeavouring to influence the organic evolution 
of mammals and birds by the production, on 
millions of different occasions, of this single mu-
tation, we can recognise that its efforts were futile 
and inoperative. Further, we can see why. In 
particular, that the polydactyl foot could not in-
corporate itself in the inheritance of any species,  
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until it had been tried out in the separate life-
history of individuals; and unless it succeeded 
there, there was no future for it. In general, that 
the process of mutation, whatever the scientific 
interest of its particular causes, is not an effective 
agency in that creative process which we call or-
ganic evolution. Bergson and his followers have 
here loaded themselves with an unnecessary dif-
ficulty. Their great point, that in the life of living 
things in the world a creative process is active, can 
at the present time be easily granted. It is in the 
particular location, in time and space, of the crea-
tive action, that their choice has been injudicious; 
injudicious scientifically, but injudicious also, I 
shall suggest, in relation to the moral and emo-
tional aspects of their philosophy. 
There is a prejudice, easily aroused by the mere 
mention of moral and emotional considerations, 
from which I must now endeavour to disentangle 
myself. We attempt, so far as our powers allow, 
to understand the world, by reasoning, by ex-
perimentation, and again by reasoning. In this 
process moral or emotional grounds for prefer-
ring one conclusion to another are completely 
out of place. Scientific findings must be based 
entirely on the scientific evidence. Nevertheless, 
to review these findings, in their bearing perhaps 
on our own future actions, may be to experience 
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perhaps reassurance, perhaps repugnance. The 
scientific purist fears that such feelings may bias the 
interpretation of the evidence, and surely he should 
guard himself against this, or any other form of 
falsification. Let our loyalty to the facts be ab-
solute. I suggest that we should also guard our-
selves against the assumption, which seems to me 
a perverse one, that the facts when ascertained 
will necessarily be antagonistic to our aims, hopes 
or aspirations. If we are prepared to learn from 
the facts, it  may sometimes be that they will 
teach us terrible things. It appears to me, however, 
an absurd degree of pessimism to assume that 
they will always tend to confound and disillusion 
us rather than to strengthen our hearts as much 
as our hands. The right answer to such pessimism, 
I suggest, is to examine candidly the moral and 
emotional effects of scientific knowledge, and not 
to conceal with shame our awareness that such 
effects exist. 
The writers with whom I am chiefly concerned 
are both strongly influenced by feelings of repug-
nance for the theory of evolution by natural selec-
tion. They both conceive it as embedded in a 
deterministic theory of the world, and it is through 
it in particular that determinism hurts their moral 
feelings. But, in such a framework, any natura-
listic theory of evolution must be equally  
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devastating; for in such a world all seeming choice 
is an illusion; we shall get what is coming to us, 
and can do nothing about it, Bergson is content 
that the inorganic world should be deterministic, 
so long as the elan vital can work its will with 
living matter. Me thus introduces another schism 
in creation, as Descartes had done before him by 
dividing the human race from the other animals. 
Smuts is more thorough; holism, like Planck's 
constant, is at work in the atoms and molecules; 
it is thought to be intrinsic to all created things. 
But, if there be an intrinsic creative activity, as 
indeterminism teaches there surely is, must we 
assume that natural selection is so bleak and arid 
as it would seem to have appeared, rather than an 
implement of creative activity as fruitful as it is 
effectual? 
Just where does the theory of natural selection 
place the creative causes which shape evolutionary 
change? In the actual life of living things; in their 
contacts and conflicts with their environments, 
with the outer world as it is to them; in their 
unconscious efforts to grow, or their more 
conscious efforts to move. Especially, in the 
vital drama of the success or failure of each of 
their enterprises. To Smuts, in particular, I should 
have liked to submit that it is a view even more in 
harmony with his own concept of holism, that  
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creative causation should be a function of every 
organ through the entire life history, of the brain 
in devising, and of the hands in execution, than 
that it should be confined to the fertilised ovum. 
To the selectionist it acts, not in the dark by 
potentiality only, but by real effects in the real 
world. 
The surface or limit separating the inner 
from the outer life of each living thing is also, 
in our experience, the true seat of our conscious-
ness, the boundary of the objective and the 
subjective, where we experience, through our 
imperfect sense-organs,  what comes to us from 
outside, and, with at least equal obscurity, that 
which rises into consciousness from within. If 
consciousness is, as it would seem, the symbol, or 
even the means, of unification in our being, this 
is the region to which creative act ivity could 
most fitly be traced.  
The theory of Selection seems to me also 
holistic, though here only Smuts could say if I 
am using his word correctly, in the mutual 
reaction of each organism with the whole ecolo-
gical situation in which it lives—the creat ive 
action of one species on another. The timid ante-
lope has played its part in the creation of the lion, 
and species long extinct must have left indelible 
memorials in their effects on species still surviving. 
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Who knows if the mammals would ever have 
evolved, but for the creative activity of the 
dinosaurs! 
It is not to be assumed, then, that though we 
resolutely and obstinately refuse to favour a 
scientific theory on account of moral edification 
or aesthetic fit ness, that these qualities will neces-
sarily be sacrificed. So far as we feel the matter 
to be one that concerns us at all, we really must 
disregard the labels on the bottles, and taste the 
contents for ourselves. The labels 'pessimism', 
'materialism', etc., have been affixed by not very 
meticulous, and not very philosophical people— 
both care and penetration seem to have been often 
lacking. Only by obtaining our personal re-
actions to these theories, as possible ingredients in 
our general outlook, can we judge whether their 
taste is, so to speak, astringent or cordial. For my 
own part I confess to feeling heartily relieved that 
it is not necessary to regard the life and death 
drama of the myriads of individual existences as 
a play, a make-believe, a shadow-show, having, 
for all the intensity and effort squandered in them, 
no real effects or consequences. There is indeed a 
strand of moral philosophy, which appeals to me 
as pure gain, which arises in comparing Natural 
Selection with the Lamarckian group of evolu-
tionary theories. In both of these contrasting 
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hypotheses living things themselves are the chief 
instruments of the Creative activity. On the 
Lamarckian view, however, they work their 
effect by willing and striving only; but, on the 
Darwinian view, it is by doing or dying. It is 
not the mere will, but its actual sequel in the real 
world, its success or failure, that is alone effective. 
We come here to a close parallelism with 
Christian discussions on the merits of Faith and 
Works. Faith, in the form of right intentions and 
resolution, is assuredly necessary, but there has, I 
believe, never been lacking through the centuries 
the parallel, or complementary, conviction that 
the service of God requires of us also effective 
action. If men are to sec our good works, it is of 
course necessary that they should be good, but 
also and emphatically that they should work, in 
making the world a better place. It is not neces-
sary that others should know by what particular 
agency the result has been brought about, but 
there must be in the result something for them 
to thank God for. We must face the difficult and 
responsible task of getting good results actually 
accomplished. Good intentions and pious ob-
servances are no sufficient substitute, and are 
noxious if accepted as substitute. 
If, to this extent, it is allowable not to repudiate 
this sublunary world as past praying for, as is 
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the oriental tendency, but to find in it a field 
for devoted activity, then it is hard to see that 
anything unedifying or disquieting should be 
found in a theory of organic evolution which rests 
essentially, not on the tendencies of living things, 
but on their performances. Both views emphasise 
responsibility for our actions, and for their natural 
consequences. Disquiet, however, has been un-
doubtedly felt, and it springs, I suggest, not from 
the acceptance of this or that view of the nature of 
Natural Causation, but from a fact the recognition 
of which is, I suppose, primary and axiomatic for 
the religious life; the fact that there is evil in the 
world, and evil also in ourselves. Any explanation 
of how the world and ourselves have come into 
existence is thus in some sense responsible for this 
fact  also. Paley's special creationism felt the strain 
when he discussed the beautifully contrived fangs 
of poisonous snakes. It is scarcely fair to saddle 
natural philosophy with the abstract and theo-
retical Problem of Evil. 
However, there is no practical problem of evil. 
We know perfectly well what to do about evil. 
We must recognise it, in ourselves and in the 
world, and repudiate it. To the best of our ability 
we must combat it, study it and extirpate it. That 
is exactly what we mean by the word Evil: that  
which we arc called upon unequivocally to attack 
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and to eliminate. On this view evil is relative; it 
changes its nature with evolutionary progress and 
with the changing structure of human society. 
Attempts at codification such as the Ten Com-
mandments,  or the Seven Deadly Sins, may 
remain valid for a long while; manifestly we 
cannot expect them to be adequate for ever. We 
are fully conscious of evil, today, for example, 
when we hear of the deliberate breaking of help-
less prisoners by torture and brutal interrogation; 
we are still not perhaps so fully conscious of the 
senseless agony occasioned when a forest fire 
sweeps through woodlands filled with the help-
less young of nesting birds, though the sense of 
human responsibility for such catastrophics is 
beginning to be felt. 
For the future, so far as we can foresee it, it 
appears to be unquestionable that the activity of 
the human race will provide the major factor in 
the environment of almost every evolving or-
ganism. Whether they act consciously or uncon-
sciously human initiative and human choice have 
become the major channels of creative activity on 
this planet. Inadequately prepared we unques-
tionably are for the new responsibilities, which 
with the rapid extension of human control over 
the productive resources of the world have been, 
as it were, suddenly thrust upon us. Yet there 
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have in recent times been some signs of a respon-
sible attitude. We have come to expect kindness 
in the treatment of the domestic animals. We 
have come to deplore the irreplaceable loss of 
some of the species which ignorance and greed 
have exterminated. The future of some wild 
animals has occasioned sufficient anxiety for the 
provision of Parks and Nature Reserves to be the 
normal policy of civilised peoples.  These are signs 
that we do not feel that ruthless exploitation is 
good enough. Our knowledge it is true is still in 
the highest degree inadequate; yet a beginning 
has been made with ecological studies, and what 
has been called population genetics, at least to 
explore the methods by which more effective 
knowledge can be obtained.  
